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THE LINACRE QUARTERLY 
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Would you be so kind as to inform me whether a Catholic 
physician can ethically form a partnership with a non­
Catholic who practices as follows contrary to the precepts 
of the Church: 1) advocates .and performs direct steriliza­
tions: 2) performs "therapeutic"· abortions: 3) dispenses 
contraceptive devices. I would appreciate a reference to 
specifi.c pronouncements of the hierarchy in regard to the 
ethics of such an association. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Father John J. Lynch, S.J., Professor of Moral Theology at Westc 
College, Weston, Mass. and consultant for THE LINACRE QUAF 
TERL Y presents the moral aspects of this proposal for the benefit c 
our readers. 
THE question as proposed is not one which can be answered without qualification, presenting as it does one of those situations c which even a moralist must say, "Circumstances alter cases." An, 
since not all the pertinent circumstances can be inferred with certaint, 
f��m the data available, no solution could claim to be more than suppo·
s1t1onal until additional facts have been ascertained. 
Before stating, however, the suppositions on which this answer i 
b�sed, it would_ 
be well to forestall any possible misunderstanding whicl
might be occasioned by the details of the problem itself. There are tw, 
such items, closely related to each other, which could distract one fro. 
the essential point of the solution. First: the fact that the other doc to, 
in �h� partnership is a non-Catholic does not bear essentially o.n th<
dec1s1on of the case. The reason for this assertion lies in item numbe; 
two, viz., that the specific procedures cited in the problem as immora: 
are not merely forbidden by the positive law of the Catholic Church 
b�t are immutable tenets of the natural law binding every human indi­
v1�ual regar_
dless of religious creed. As Fr. Gerald Kelly, S.J., has
pomted out m previous comments on the Catholic Hospital Code, " . .. 
a ?o�ble standard cannot be admitted when there is question of the
prmc1ples of natural law and of their application to medical cases. For 
since this law is the same for all human nature, it holds equally for 
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non-Catholic patients and Catholic patients, for Catholic doctors and 
non-Catholic doctors. "1 Hence, whatever the conclusion reached· regard­
ing a medical partnership of this kind, difference of faith is a substan­
tially irrelevant factor. 
Proceeding then on that understanding, these are the suppositions or 
assumptions of which I previously made mention. I presume, first of all, 
that medical "partnership" is intended to mean something substantially 
more than merely sharing an off ice. In other words. I understand that 
this is a partnership in the commonly accepted and legal sense of the 
word ( to whatever extent legal partnership may be compatible with the 
established ethics of the medical profession )-the sort of thing which 
might be exemplified in a private clinic operated jointly by two or more 
doctors who "have joined together in the practice of medicine, and so 
hold themselves out to the public and patients, where all income and 
expenses are a joint account or joint venture."2 I take for granted, too, 
that the Catholic physician would readily recognize the immorality on 
his part of any explicit approval, even only interior, of the illicit phase 
of his partner's practice, and would a fortiori realize that he could pro­
vide no physical assistance in any such medical or surgical procedures. 
The problem then is reduced to that of being formally associated in 
partnership with a physician, some of whose common practices are 
admittedly immoral. In those immoral procedures the Catholic doctor 
does not participate physically, nor does he grant them explicit approval. 
With regard to specific pronouncements of the hierarchy on that 
precise situation, there is none to my knowledge; unless possibly some 
directive on the point be included in a local hospital code with which I 
am not familiar. It would be simply impossible for Church authorities to 
legislate expressly for every conceivable moral situation; and hence it 
must frequently happen that the Church leave to theologians the task of 
providing solutions for concrete cases as they occur by applying stand­
ard moral rules. This, I would say, is one of those instances where, 
instead of enjoying the convenience of an explicit directive to solve a 
problem, we are left to work it out for ourselves in the light of general 
moral principles. 
What answer, then, would a moralist give to this problem? On the 
basis of the above assumptions, my own opinion - with which I feel 
confident other moralists would agree substantially-is that there appear 
to be at least two serious reasons for saying that such a partnership is 
not morally permissible, while no reason occurs as sufficient to justify 
the association. (It should be apparent that this is not an apodictical 
and universal solution, but one ·which is based only on available infor-
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mation, with the realization that other facts as yet undisclosed mig 1t 
possibly persuade me to qualify my decision in an individual case.) 
THE MALICE OF COOPERATING IN ANOTHER'S SIN 
The first reason is derived from the natural law prohibition again t 
cooperating with the sinful acts of others · or, to put it another wa 
against helping others to commit sin. It stands to reason that if or � 
person willingly assists another in the actual performance of  an intrins 
cally evil act, his cooperation is sinful on two scores: first because c: 
his willful approval of the evil intrinsic to the sinful act itself, an I 
secondly because of his violation of fraternal charity in being a willin J 
instrument of another's sin. Love of neighbor obliges us  to refraiI . 
insofar as is reasonably possible, from allowing evil to befall other .. 
even when they themselves are intent upon it. And what greater ev \ 
than that of sin can be alleged? Thus, for instance, the doctor, wh· · 
would agree actually to assist in an illicit operation, would stand i1 
conscience accused of this two-fold malice: of having violated, first, th. 
fifth commandment and, secondly, his grave duty of fraternal charity 
However, we are supposing that this manner of cooperation is no 
verified in the present case. 
But it frequently happens that one's cooperation with another's si1 
consists, not in a participation in the very act which is sinful, but rathe. 
in some more remote action which, though innocent perhaps in itself 
does make it possible or less difficult for the other to commit his sin. I 
that sinful possibility is foreseen as a likely result of my innocent action 
I am still obliged by charity to refrain, as far as is reasonably possible 
from allowing another to perpetrate that moral evil. In other words 
there must be good and substantial reason for my performing even ar 
act innocent in itself. if that act is recognized as one which will helr: 
another to sin. The gravity of the reason required to justify my acting 
and thus permitting him to perform the evil on which he is intent, wil1 
vary according to the gravity of the sin foreseen and according to the 
relative importance of my act to his opportunity for sinning. And unde1 
no circumstances may one intend that his act be of assistance to 
· another's sin. Here again we have application of the familiar principle
of double effect to justify our doing something. good or indifferent in
itself, which will have two immediate results, one good and the other
evil. And among the conditions requisite for the legitimate use of that
principle are absence of all evil intention on the part of the agent, and
moral proportion between good and bad effect.
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Is there verified in the case at hand this concept of cooperation in 
another's sin; and if so, is it a permissible or illicit form of cooperation? 
According to our original assumption, the Catholic doctor does not 
cooperate with his partner by participating physically in the actual 
procedures mentioned, nor does he in any way explicitly approve .them. 
Theologians therefore would admit that his cooperation, if any, is not 
immediate in that sense, but at most mediate, i.e. contributing to the 
partner's sin through the medium of other actions perhaps good or indif­
ferent in themselves. They would then attempt to determine whether 
the fact of partnership facilitates the unethical practices of the one, and 
whether even that degree of mediate cooperation on the other's part is 
sincerely unintended to be such and only grudgingly permitted because 
of some other necessary good to be achieved through the medical 
partnership. They would, in short, be vitally concerned about the 
Catholic doctor's real attitude towards the moral deviations of his asso­
ciate, whether it be one of genuine or only simulated disapproval. For 
as was said before, to approve of sin, either one's own or another's, is 
. in itself sinful. 
. And under such scrutiny the conduct of the "innocent" partner 
might easily provide cause for moral criticism on such grounds, for 
example, as the following: 
a) Unquestionably any two doctors, who enter into a partnership, do
so for the mutual advantages entailed, and each thereby expresses
himself as willing that the other benefit from their association. Now
one advantage to be expected for the non-Catholic in this case is
that his confrere's known religion should attract a certain number of
patients who prefer to entrust their medical treatment to a Catholic
conscience, and who in good faith would presume as guarantee suff i­
cient against immoral advice or procedures that lone fact qf a
Catholic's associating himself with the partnership. Let us suppose
that in continued good faith, or after suasion by the non-Catholic
doctor, some of these patients are submitted to illicit treatment.
. Those evils are in some sense the responsibility of the Catholic
· partner, whose religion and presumed integrity provided the initial
attraction for those patients and made possible those specific sins on
the part of his associate.
b) How would the Catholic react to direct requests from any of his own
patients for contraceptive advice or illicit surgery? Morally he is
obliged to refuse all such requests, nor can he refer them, even by
implication, to his less scrupulous associate. If he should, he would
again be helping others to sin, and could scarcely deny that he does
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not intend their sinful act. Presumably the non-Catholic would f :
unwilling that these patients be turned away, and normally woul :l
demand that they at least be referred to him. How would the
Catholic solve that situation to the satisfaction of his partner and
without compromising moral principles?
c) If medical partnership is correctly interpreted as a situation wher
"all income and expenses are a joint account and joint venture," th
fact of cooperation in and approval of illicit practices is again cliff:
cult to evade. A portion of those expenses and a portion of the
income are presumably due to immoral medical procedures. To he!
meet those expenses, or to share in those proceeds, surely betrays
spirit of cooperation and approval which cannot be condoned.
Those are but some of the objections which might be leveled agaim
a partnership of this kind. It cannot of course be said with certainty th2.
all, or even any, of the above instances of cooperation are necessaril·
verified in every such medical partnership. But it is difficult for me t
see how the Catholic doctor in such a situation can entirely avoid coop
erating in one such serious way or another with the illicit practices c
his associate. Hence, as I stated originally, I see here a grave reaso:
militating against this type of partnership, while no reason occurs to m
as sufficient to justify it. Furthermore ( and this is possibly of evei
greater importance), even if the Catholic doctor were, both in word an,
in fact, totally unsympathetic and uncooperative with the immora
phases of his partner's practice, that is not the interpretation whicl
people in general commonly make of such an association. And tha
brings us to the second consideration, that of scandal.
THE MALICE OF SCANDAL 
;,candal is a much underestimated moral concept among those whc
do not appreciate its theological implications. Because of the compara­
tively mild significance which our common usage has attached to tht
words, we are inclined to interpret "scandalize" in the sense of shockin�
or horrifying others, and the substantive "scandal" comes to mear.
either the fact at which they are shocked or the defamatory gossip b;
which they are informed of the shocking fact. The theological truth ol
the matter goes deeper than that, and "to give scandal" means techni­
cally to provide another through one's own example with an inducement
or enticement to sin. Clearly, scandal is as much contrary to fraternal
charity as is cooperation in another's sin. In fact, some theologian:,
might consider it more so; for whereas they consider the cooperator as
one who assists another, already intent on sin and hence already a
I' 
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sinner, to carry out his determined purpose, they see i� .scand.al adecisive factor in bringing the will of another to its ongmal smful
decision. But in any event, scandal in its theological sense can be a
serious moral matter.
This inducement to sin, which is scandal, may have its_ effect in anyone or more of several ways. What one says or does may, for example,
provide a direct temptation for others, as might the risqu� story, which 
may perhaps be a relatively harmless thing when told m a group of
normal adults, but which could easily be a source of impure thoughts for
impressionable adolescents. Or one 's example may serve to per�u�de 
another that something actually sinful is permissible ; or that comm1ttmg
a sin is not such a terrible thing after all; or that the alleged ideals of
our religion are mere sham and hypocrisy. and that therefore the faith
we profess is to be despised and shunned. Suppose a priest were to be 
seen eating meat on Friday in a public restaurant: would not there be
danger that some Catholics, observing this anomaly, would b�. tempted to think less of the Church's law of abstinence and to argue, 1f he can
do it, so can I"? And might not non-Catholics, who are .commonly quite
aware of our Friday obligation, have reason to despise and ridicule the
hypocrisy of the priest who professes one thing and practices another.
and thus be further alienated from Catholicism which he represents?
Examples of scandal are almost without number, but they all share .incommon that element of presenting another with an inducement to sm. 
Now it cannot be denied that even the most innocent of human
actions will at times be subject to misinterpretation because of either
ignorance or even ·sheer malice on the part of others. Thus the priest, in
the example cited above, may be legitimately dispensed or excused from
the law of abstinence because of seriously poor health. Yet if those who
observe him eating meat on Friday do not advert to that possibility
( ignorance of sorts on their part). or stubbornly refuse to consider it. asa likely explanation of his acting as he does (malice), there still remams
the possibility of their being scandalized by an act which is obje�ti�elygood and lawful. Must we therefore refrain from even perm1ss1ble
actions whenever we· foresee that scandal may be taken from them?
Common sense tells us that we are not always so obliged, and moral
theology ratifies common sense by conceding that if we have good and 
sufficient reason for our action, a reason proportionate to the harm
which may result in the form of unintended scandal, we may leg_iti!11atelyact and permit the unintended evil effect. Hence the moralist s rule 
governing unintended scandal represents still another application of the
principle of double effect, and requires, together with the other usual
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conditions, a reason in proportion to the evil which may result froi 1 
one's innocent manner of acting. 
How is scandal, in the sense of enticement to sin, verified in th-� 
situation under discussion? People commonly assume that declarec1 
partners in medical practice are in substantial agreement as to bot­
medical procedures and medical morals. When it becomes known ( an, 
it would not long remain a secret) that one partner advocates an< 
indulges in practices contrary to natural law, it will be presumed eithe 
that the Catholic party is in sympathy with those immoral practices, o 
at least that he condones them in his partner ( even while righteous!· 
disclaiming· any part in them himself) and is sharing in the proceed 
from them. Because of this seeming bad example on the part of one whr 
represents himself as a Catholic - and remember that a doctor is :.· 
person of prestige in any community and that his example is more tha1 
ordinarily influential-it is not unlikely that some of the faithful migh · 
be induced to think lightly of birth-control, abortion, etc.; while non 
Catholics, knowing well our professed stand on such practices, migh · 
find confirmation for their own erroneous convictions, and grounds fo, 
ridiculing Catholicism for preaching one doctrine and condoning it! 
contrary. "How is it that Dr. So-and-So can be associated in somethinc 
the Church claims to be gravely sinful and yet be allowed to receive th; 
Sacraments? Either the Church's doctrine is hypocrisy, or else we havE 
been too credulous in believing that those practices are so very wrong." 
_That in general could easily be common reaction to such a situation, and 
that is serious public scandal. 
And for the physician to say, "I am not responsible for the misin­
terpretations which ignorant and suspicious people make of my innocen! 
actions" would be to miss entirely the point regarding scandal. B 
creating a situation which makes such an interpretation likely, and by 
doing so without a sufficiently grave reason, one makes himself respon­
sible for contributing somewhat to the sin of others-something which, 
as we have said, charity forbids if it can be reasonably avoided. 
Hence to the original question, as supplemented by the several 
assumptions which it seemed necessary to make, 1 would conclude that 
meqical partnership of this nature would be morally reprehensible. 
unless possibly because of an extraordinary and grave reason. So great 
would be the expectancy of serious scandal, and so difficult to avoid all 
manner of sinful cooperation and approbation, that I for one cannot 
suggest a practical situation in which such a partnership might seem to 
be permissible. Perhaps, however, conscientious physicians, who are 
more aware than myself of medical realities, could cite circumstances 
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which would require modification of that conclusion. Meanwhile, if I 
may be permitted to apply to this question a bit of sound advice· which 
Fr. John C. Ford, S.J., includes in his discussion of psychoanalysis,3 I 
would suggest that the best practical way to avoid the moral problem is 
to choose a medical partner whose principles and practices are known 
not to offend against Christian morality. 
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THE MARIAN YEAR 
YET this centenary ... of the solemn definition of the Immaculate Conception 
... sho�ld not only serve to revive Catholic faith and earnest devotion to the Mother 
of God in the souls of all, but Christians should also, in as far as possible, conform 
their lives to the image of the same Virgin. Just as all mothers are deeply affected 
when they perceive that the countenance of their children refle<;ts a peculiar likeness 
,to their own, so also our Most Sweet Mother wishes for nothing more, never rejoices 
more than when she sees those whom, under the cross of her Son, she has adopted as 
children in His stead portray the lineaments and ornaments of her own soul in 
thought, word, and deed. 
But if this. devotion is not to consist of mere words, is not to be counterfeit coin 
of religion or the weak and transitory affection of a moment, but is to be something 
sincere, true and efficacious, it is necessary that each one of us should, according to 
his co�dition ·of life, avail of it for the acquisition of virtue. The commemoration of 
the mystery of the Most Holy Virgin, conceived immaculate and immune from all 
stain of original sin, should, in the first place, urge us to that innocence and integrity 
of life which flees from and abhors even the slightest stain of sin. 
... Fu/gens Corona (The Radiant Crown) 
encyclical letter of His Holiness, 
Pope Pius XII on The Mc,rian Year 
